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ABSTRACT
Most work concerning secure computer systems has dealt with
the design, verification, and implementation of provably secure
computer systems, or has explored ways of making existing com-
puter systems more secure. The problem of locating security holes
in existing systems has received considerably less attention;
methods generally rely on "thought experiments" as a critical step
in the procedure. The difficulty is that such experiments require
that a large amount of information be available in a format that
makes correlating the details of various programs straightforward.
This paper describes a method of providing such a basis for the
"thought experiment" by writing a special manual for parts of the
operating system, system programs, and library subroutines.
1. Introduction
Published work in the security of computer systems tends to take one of two
directions. The work may center on a new, secure (possibly provably so) com-
puter system, and discuss its design, implementation, and verification, or the
techniques used to do any (or all) of these steps. Less commonly, the work may
report ways of improving the security of an existing system by discussing the
known problems and methods to counter these threats. Only a few papers[l]
deal with how to analyze an existing computer system in order to locate security
Work reported here was supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Admiaiatra-
tion under contract NAS2-11530.
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.problems
At this point, we should remind ourselves what we are trying to do. Users
who have legitimate access to the system are authorized users. If the permissions
on the system are set to allow someone to perform an action, that action is an
authorized action; if the action is performed in the absence of such permission, it
is an unauthorized action. A secure system is a system which allows only author-
ized users to perform only authorized actions. For example, if a user is not
known to the system administrator (by an entry in the password file), he is not
an authorized user and hence should not be able to access the system. Similarly,
a breach of security occurs whenever an authorized user performs an unauthor-
ized action, or when an unauthorized user obtains access to the system.
There are several reasons to check existing programs. The most important
is that the design, implementation, and verification of new code takes quite some
time, during which the new code could not be used. When one realizes that most
operating systems were not designed with security as the primary consideration,
the magnitude of such a task becomes apparent. Existing code, on the other
hand, could be used for increasingly privileged tasks as it is examined in stages
for security flaws. Second, given that there is already enough existing code to
keep a nonsecure system functioning, it may be more cost-effective to check the
code for security holes rather than rewriting it completely. Finally, once it is
written, new software can be treated like existing software.
Unfortunately, lack of formal verification poses problems. The best way to
reduce the number of security problems is "to use formal security verification
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methods to. assure "that the mandatory :.. security controls: employed in the sys-
tem can effectively protect ... sensitive information stored or processed by the
system."[2] To do this, the developers must state their security policy, the
axioms used to implement the security policy, and using these axioms present a
mathematical proof that the system satisfies the security policy. Then, they
must show the implementation of the operating system conforms to the design.
(LOCUS[3) and PSOS[4] are examples of proposed operating systems for which
mechanisms of formal verification have been described.) Throughout this pro-
cedure is an assumption that the system is designed with this type of verification
in mind. To submit an existing system to this procedure, one must first decide
on a security policy, and then model the system mathematically and show that
the system not only satisfies the security policy, but also is accurately
represented by the mathematical model. Abstraction of a mathematical descrip-
tion from the operating system is far more difficult than implementing the
operating system from the mathematical description.
It is important to realize that no method will provide the same degree of
security as formally verifying a system; however, less rigorous methods can
reveal security flaws, and make the writing and checking of secure system
software easier and less prone to error.
2. The Starting Point
Given that mathematical verification is not suitable, let us look at other
methods of testing, and improving, system security. The most obvious is an ad
hoe approach of trying types of attacks that have proven successful on this, or
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other,, operating systems-in the past.' Although doing so is very effective hi dis-
covering specific security problems, it does not provide a broad, systematic
approach for discovering flaws in the security of computer systems, or for testing
new components.
A generalization of this method will provide a foundation for analyzing
security problems. One technique for penetrating operating systems involves a
formal strategy called the "Flaw Hypothesis Methodology."[5] It consists of four
parts: knowing how the target operating system interacts with users, hypothesiz-
ing a flaw in that interaction, confirming that the flaw exists (through "thought
experiments" and actual testing), and generalizing the flaw, and similar flaws, to
a design or implementation deficiency in that operating system. Clearly, the
most difficult part is taking the first step, from the knowledge of the operating
system to the supposition of flaws.
Before, discussing ways to make this easier, let us try to categorize the main
areas in which problems arise, to gain some insight about where to look. Bisbey,
Carlstedt, and Hollingsworth at the University of Southern California's Informa-
tion Sciences Institute have identified several categories of system flaws which
can produce security violations. The following list summarizes them by listing
main areas, each broken into sub-areas:*
(1) Improper protection (initialization and enforcement):
(la) improper choice of initial protection domain; for example, an incorrect
choice of a protection domain or security partition leading to a user
* This organization is from Peter Neumann[6).
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: being able to access and change an audit trail;
(Ib). improper .isolation of implementation detail; for example, allowing
users to bypass operating system controls and write to absolute
input/out put addresses;
(Ic) improper change; for example, allowing data to be inconsistent while
still in use, by letting one process change a database file while
another, different process is accessing that file;
(Id) improper naming; for example, allowing two different programs to
have the same name;
(le) improper deallocation or deletion; for example, leaving old data in
memory deallocated by one process and reallocated to another pro-
cess, enabling the second process to access the information used by
the first;
(2) Improper validation; for example, not checking critical conditions and
parameters, leading to a process' addressing memory not in its memory
space by referencing through an out-of-bounds pointer value;
(3) Improper synchronization:
(3a) improper indivisibility; for example, interrupting atomic operations
such as locking;
(3b) improper sequencing; such as allowing race conditions among
processes vying for resources;
(4) Improper choice of operand or operation; such as using unfair scheduling
algorithms that block certain processes or users from running.
-6 -
Although certainly not complete, this list provides a means of classifying most
security problems, and is quite suitable as an outline of areas in which problems
of security will arise.
Now that we have guidelines on where to look, we must consider how to go
about looking. Unfortunately, there is no way to do this other than by trial and
error. (There has been some discussion of problems leading to, and attacks tak-
ing advantage of, security flaws in operating systems generally[4,6], as well as
discussions of the security of specific operating systems[7,8,9].) Such methods
may be made more effective if the trials are done systematically rather than at
random. One technique to systematize the search is to use a dependency graph
of the control objects in the operating system to study their interaction and look
for possible problems that may enable an attacker to breach security. Among
the difficulties with this are the generation of the graph, and its being under-
stood by those not familiar with the layout of the graph.
Before examining another technique, let us analyze the problem of finding
security holes a bit further.
3. Laying the Groundwork
The key point in looking for security flaws is recognizing that the security
problems we are dealing with arise from interactions between the user and the
operating system. Specifically, the user creates a condition using one or more
programs and then executes another program or programs which cause the
operating system to ignore specific protections. For example, to copy a pro-
tected file, the user must force the operating system to ignore or override this
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pratection^for example,-by running a program at a level pf privilege sufficient to
cause file protections to be ineffective.)
Unfortunately, any list of methods to do this will contain only a subset of
all possible methods, since any new system program would add many new ways
to evade protections. Even if such a list could be made, it would be very
different for each operating system, because each operating system has its own
design and implementation philosophy, and the latter often differ in ways that
affect very subtle points of interaction. Similarly, programs perform different
tasks, and the work needed to catalogue all of the possible jobs programs may do
will be endless. Indeed, the required level of security differs, too; programs exe-
cuted with special powers (such as root or operator privileges) must be checked
for security violations that need not be looked for in other nonprivileged pro-
grams.
But the problems that arise come from the interaction of users with the
operating system, as we have said. The only two ways for a user to interact
with the operating system are through programs (software) and through equip-
ment attached to the computer (hardware), in the latter case the interface being
the kernel. So, in order to examine the way users interact with the operating
system, we must study how the programs interact with the operating system,
and the device drivers and other routines through which the equipment interacts
with the kernel.
Let us deal with individual programs first. To study how they interact with
the kernel, we shall try to abstract the functionality of the program from the
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actuaL code.: This-will have two effects. First, it-will separate security problems
introduced by the coding of the program from those introduced by the design of
the program. Then, the design of the program can be checked, both for internal
security problems and for security problems arising from interaction with other
programs. Once this is done, the implementation can be examined to ensure
that it does not introduce other security problems.
The first step, therefore, is to figure out what the program does, and how it
goes about doing it. For the first part, system documentation will provide some
guidance, but because documentation very often is incorrect, incomplete, or
imprecise, it is not always good to rely on it; hence, for both learning what the
program does, and how it does it, one must go through the program code.
Second, one must document all interaction with the operating system (such as
the files looked at, and how the program uses them.) In particular, one must
document all error checking and recovery (or the lack of it.)
As an outline, the following organization for this document would be
appropriate:
Name
This is the name of the program. If the program may be invoked by any of
several names, all should be listed.
Actions
Although similar to a specification, this section should conform to the code and
not to what the program is supposed to do. This section requires that the
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implemeniation- .be examined, and written out in such detail; that someone not
familiar with the code could understand not only the action of the program, but
how it works, and what side effects it has. If library routines or programs
already documented in this fashion are used, it is often useful to refer to the
appropriate pages rather than recapitulate the actions of those routines or pro-
grams.
Apparent Assumptions
This presents any inherent assumptions. For example, if a file is assumed to be
in a specific format, this should be noted here. If an assumption about the
meaning of an error condition is made, list it here.
Files Used
This section names the system and user files used. It also contains a short
description of each, any assumptions made about format, and the system calls
used to access each.
System Calls
This lists all the system calls used.
Execution Modes
This is most useful for programs; it describes who may execute the program and
with what privileges the program executes.
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Known Bugs
Any known security problems are listed here. As security holes are found, they
should be added. Note that suspicions should be listed (but marked as suspi-
cions) until they are proven or disproven.
Error Handling
This describes what happens if errors occur. For example, suppose an index into
an array is out of bounds; does the program dump core? Suppose a file is not in
the correct format? Are there checks to ensure any reading or writing succeeds?
Library Functions Used
List the names, versions, and dates of any library functions used.
Manual Page Version
Give the author, date, version of the program, and system for which this docu-
ment was prepared.
We shall call this document the security manual page to distinguish it from the
usual manual page. (A sample page, for the UNIX* library routine getlogin, fol-
lows the references.)
Of course, in the section, one should document any discovered security prob-
lems.
This documentation should not be confined to the program only. Very
UNIX ia a Trademark of Bell Laboratories.
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pften system programs-.need to perform a task such' as looking up a name in a
table to obtain associated data. These functions are performed so often that
they have been collected into a set of library routines. Since these routines affect
the function of each program in which they are used, it would save time and
work to document these routines as described above. This would provide one
reference for each library routine, rather than having the same routine be
checked once for each program in which it is used (and risking a security hole
being overlooked once). Similarly, new programs should use library routines
whenever possible, and rather than duplicating code amongst several programs,
the code should be changed into a library routine which the programs then call.
As an example of why documentation that describes the implementation of
a program or library routine is necessary, consider the getlogin() bug, which
exists on many UNIX systems. According to the manual[lO], "[gjetlogin returns a
pointer to the login name as found in /etc/utmp." Although accurate, this
description is very imprecise. Getlogin actually returns the login name of the
user whose terminal is associated with the input, output, or error streams; this
may or may not be the same as the login name of the person who executed the
program. The security manual page should make this final statement, even
though the manual page states getlogin's function as indicated.**
Because of its complexity and function, the kernel must be checked
differently than system programs and libraries. The principle is the same —
analyze the code and document those parts which interact with other programs
See the sample security manual page that follows the references.
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and equipment ..—.= but many; security-manual pages, not just-one, will be written
for it. Specifically, at least one page per system call and .device driver will be
necessary, stating error conditions and precisely how they are handled, as well as
how the system calls and device drivers are accessed. Main components of the
kernel — the initialization routines, the scheduler, and so forth — must also be
documented, as must any routines that rely on files or specific memory locations
or any other external factors.
Hence, the first step to checking the security of programs and the operating
system is:
Document each program, system call and device driver, and library rou-
tine thoroughly, not just as to purpose but also as to its side effects and
error handling.
4. Hypothesizing the Flaws
Once a manual page or set of manual pages have been written, the process
of locating security flaws begins. Unfortunately, the only known approach to
doing this is largely ad hoc.
There are analogies in other fields. For example, the only way communica-
tions analysts can assess vulnerabilities of communications systems is to study
the system thoroughly, and then draw on their knowledge of that system, their
experience, and their knowledge of attacks that worked with other systems, to
hypothesize security problems. They then test for these suspected flaws. The
situation is precisely the same for computer security.
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:-x. As with -analyses of the ^vulnerability of communications systems, we-can
draw on past experience. There have been a number of studies of operating sys-
tem security in general and of specific penetrations of various operating systems
(some of these have been referred to earlier.) These studies provide knowledge of
attacks that worked with many different systems. Combined with the knowledge
gleaned from mathematical analyses of other systems and the weaknesses
uncovered using those tools, all this experience provides a very solid background
for hypothesizing security flaws.
The security manual described in the previous section will provide both the
means of studying the system thoroughly and a reference guide useful in formu-
lating hypotheses. As each program or routine algorithm is considered by itself,
flaws may become apparent. (In fact, this happened with the getlogin manual
page attached to this report. The second of the section was found by noticing
the assumption made in step 4 of the algorithm, comparing it to step 3, and
wondering what would happen if the assumption was invalid.) Correlating pro-
grams which use the same system files may reveal that the interaction of some
such programs presents attackers with opportunities to subvert the system, or
that these programs make inconsistent assumptions (or invalid assumptions)
about the data in the file, or the way the file is used. A similar comment holds
for programs and system calls; special attention should be paid to those system
calls used to access and manipulate system files. The section on error handling
should be quite fruitful for hypothesizing flaws. Many error conditions are not
adequately handled, not handled correctly, or simply ignored. Very often this
produces unusual situations that may present security holes which a clever
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attacker can exploit[ll,12].
Hence, the second step to checking the security of programs and the operat-
ing system is:
Drawing on the documentation, past experience, and general knowledge
of operating system vulnerabilities, hypothesize security flaws in the com-
puter system, and test either to confirm or to deny that those flaws exist.
5. Summary
When checking an existing computer system for security, both the operating
system kernel and the system libraries and privileged programs must be exam-
ined. (If none of these has security flaws, applications programs will not be able
to breach security.) They should be examined in the above order; note that this
will ensure that the operating system calls, which are the basis for system library
routines and system programs, will be examined before the code using them is
examined.
Within each of these aspects, the steps of the "Flaw Hypothesis Method" as
described in sections 2, 3, and 4 should be used to locate security flaws, paying
special attention to the problem areas described in section 2. For each aspect, a
security manual of the sort described in section 3 should be written and used as
the basis for examining the interaction of the various components of the kernel,
the libraries, and the system programs as discussed in section 4.
While this method will not ensure perfect security of a computer system, it
will significantly increase the difficulty of an attacker penetrating the system.
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- - • • " Appendix — Security Manual Page
NAME
getlogin — get login name
INVOCATION
char *getlogin();
ACTIONS
Getlogin returns the user believed to be using the controlling terminal. It
does this as follows:
1. Find the first of the file descriptors 0, 1, 2 associated with a terminal by
running an ioctl(2) on each and seeing which one succeeds; if all fail,
return 0.
2. Find the device/inode pair corresponding to that terminal by using
fstat(2), and scan the files in the directory /dev/ until one is found with
that device/inode pair. If none is found, return 0.
3. Search the file /etc/ttys for that file name, and count the number of lines
N skipped before it is found. If not found, return 0.
4. Read the JVth record in /etc/utmp; this corresponds to the user currently
using that terminal. It is in the format of utmp(5).
5. Return the contents of the ut name field of that record. Note it is kept
in a static area, and is overwritten the next time getlogin is called.
APPARENT ASSUMPTIONS
The first of the file descriptors 0, 1, and 2 that is associated with a terminal
is associated with the terminal the user logged in on.
The number of the (text) line in /etc/ttys describing a terminal corresponds
to the offset into the file /etc/utmp for that terminal.
FILES USED
/etc/ttys List of terminal names, one per line; open(2), read(2), close(2)
/etc/utmp List of logged-in users; assumes each record corresponds to a line
in /etc/ttys and that the records have the same order; open(2),
lseek(2), read(2), close(2)
/dev/ Directory containing files corresponding to terminals; used to
determine the name of the controlling terminal; .open(2), read(2),
close(2)
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SYSTEM CALLS
, fstat(2), ioct/(2), lseek(2), open(2), read(2), s6rfc(2), stat(2)
EXECUTION MODES
This is a system library function.
KNOWN BUGS
If the first file descriptor found to be associated with a terminal is not asso-
ciated with the controlling terminal, the name of the user at the associated
terminal will be returned, and not the name of the user at the controlling
terminal.
If a line is added to or deleted from /etc/ttys, the algorithm used to associ-
ate users with their terminal names fails miserably. This problem can be
corrected by looking in the ut _ term field of the record and comparing it
with the name obtained from /etc/ttys.
ERROR HANDLING
On error, it is supposed to return 0.
No error check to be sure the lseek(2) to the record in /etc/utmp succeeds.
No error check to be sure the record in /etc/utmp corresponds to the name
of the terminal.
Silently assumes names which are shorter than the space allocated in the
record for user names are blank padded.
LIBRARY FUNCTIONS USED
NAME VERSION DATE
getlogin.c 4.2 11/14/82
isatty.c 4.1 (Berkeley) 12/21/80
ttyslot.c 4.1 (Berkeley) 12/21/80
ttyname.c 4.3 (Berkeley) 5/7/82
closedir.c 4.5 (Berkeley) 7/1/83
opendir.c 4.5 (Berkeley) 7/1/83
readdir.c 4.5 (Berkeley) 7/1/83
MANUAL PAGE VERSION
AUTHOR Matt Bishop
DATE December 1, 1985
SYSTEM 4.2 BSD
VERSION getlogin.c 4.2 (11/14/82)
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